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INTRODUCTION

"The great thing about human language is that it prevents us
from sticking to the matter at hand."'
During the debate on the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act ("SLUSA"),2 Representative Tom Bliley echoed the
prevailing sentiment3 that "lawsuits alleging violations that involve
securities that are offered nationally belong in Federal Court."4
Despite this seemingly clear congressional intent, however, inartful
drafting has allowed certain securities class actions to escape federal
court. For example, in In re Tyco International,Limited Multidistrict

Litigation,' Tyco was subject to forty-seven separate lawsuits in
several different states for a variety of securities violations.6 The
1. LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 112
(1974).
2. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 77v, 77z-1, 78-4, and 78bb (2000)).
3. See infra Part III.
4. 144 CONG. REC. 26,537, 26,537 (1998) (emphasis added).
5. 322 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H. 2004).
6. Id. at 117.
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defendants consolidated many of the cases and removed them to
federal court in New Hampshire.7 The District of New Hampshire,
however, remanded seven of these cases because they only alleged
violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").8 The
district court reasoned that the wording of the removal provision in
the Securities Act, as modified by SLUSA, only granted defendants
the right to remove state claims to federal court,9 thus forcing Tyco to
defend the federal claims in multiple state courts.
Remanding cases to state court prejudices defendant
corporations because the requirements of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), ° which were designed to reduce
unmeritorious class action litigation," apply only in federal court. 2
Leaving corporations vulnerable to unmeritorious suits compromises
the integrity of the securities market and ultimately harms investors. 3
Although Congress enacted SLUSA to move most securities class
actions to federal court, the wording of the removal provision seems
to conflict with this intention.14 Specifically, SLUSA fails to
adequately address the nonremoval provision in the Securities Act,
causing some federal courts to remand cases brought under the
Securities Act that do not also include a state-law claim. 5 Indeed,
dicta in a recent United States
Supreme Court decision supports this
16
construction of the statute..
This Comment examines the statutory arguments, legislative
history, and policy implications underlying the dispute over the scope
of the Securities Act's removal provision and argues for a broad
construction of the statute-one that extends removal authority to
class actions alleging only Securities Act violations. Part I provides a
general background of the federal securities laws and the conflict over
removal. Part II first examines the language of the Securities Act and
the source of the jurisdictional conflict, and then makes three
7. See id.
8. Id. at 122; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000) (regulating offerings of securities).
9. In re Tyco Int'l, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see infra Part II.C (detailing
Congress's motivation for the enactment of SLUSA).
11. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 56.
13. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
16. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2154-55 (2006); see also infra
notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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arguments for a broad reading of removal authority. Part II also
analyzes the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Merrill Lynch,
7 and Kircher v. Putnam Funds
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit"
18
Trust and attempts to reconcile the apparent inconsistency in the
Supreme Court's guidance for interpreting the Securities Act's
removal provision. Part III examines the legislative history of
SLUSA, which demonstrates Congress's intent to permit removal of
Securities Act class actions. Finally, Part IV analyzes the policy
implications of such an outcome and argues that a broad reading
comports with Congress's goal of improving market efficiency and
protecting investors.
I. BACKGROUND
Jurisdiction over Securities Act claims is best understood in the
context of federal court jurisdiction generally. Federal question
jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that
"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."' 9 However, plaintiffs can also file federal claims in state
court.2 0 To ensure that plaintiffs are not the ultimate arbiters of
jurisdiction, title 28 of the United States Code authorizes defendants
to remove most federal law claims brought in state court to federal
court. 21 Specifically, § 1441(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed ... to the district court of the
United States. 22 However, the Securities Act includes a provision
that "expressly provide[s]" that actions brought under it cannot be

17. 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
18. 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). The federal courts also have diversity jurisdiction. See
§ 1332. Furthermore, § 22 of the Securities Act explicitly gives federal courts original
jurisdiction over claims arising under the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) ("The district courts of
the United States and United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of
offenses and violations under this subchapter.").
20. 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 120.10 (3d ed.
2006) (providing that most "state courts also have jurisdiction over most kinds of actions
arising under federal law, and are competent to adjudicate federal claims pleaded in a
state complaint"). Section 1441 suggests this result by giving the defendant the option of
removal, thus implying that the action can remain in state court if not removed. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441.
21. § 1441.
22. Id. § 1441(a) (emphasis added).
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removed to federal court. 3 Specifically, § 22 of the Securities Act
provides concurrent, nonremovable jurisdiction by stating that "no
case arising under this title and brought in any State court ... shall be
removed to any court of the United States."24 As one pre-SLUSA
case noted, § 1441(a)'s "except" provision is "clearly a reference to
statutes such as [the Securities Act]." 25 SLUSA, however, amended
this provision. 6 This Comment examines SLUSA's amendment to

the Securities Act and argues that nonremovable jurisdiction no
longer exists for Securities Act claims brought by large class actions.

Passed in the wake of the stock market crash in 1929, the
Securities Act of 193327 provided the first comprehensive federal

regulation of securities markets.2 8 The Securities Act adopted the
disclosure method of market regulation instead of a merit-based
approach.29 Under the merit-based approach, regulators assess the

fairness of proposed transactions and have the authority to prevent
economically disadvantageous securities from being traded.
The
disclosure approach of the Securities Act, however, adopts the notion
that "sunlight is ...the best of disinfectants, 31 and attempts "to
provide full and fair disclosure as to securities sold in interstate and
foreign markets. 3 2 The Securities Act accomplishes this by requiring

companies to file a registration statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") 33 and to furnish prospective investors

23. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
24. Id.
25. Farmers & Merchs. Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners, 702 F. Supp. 1417, 1419-20
(D. Ark. 1988) ("[S]ection [1441(a)] is inapplicable because Congress has explicitly
prohibited removal of claims under the Securities Act of 1933.").
26. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101,
112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2000)).
27. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
28. 3 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, Cox & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS
§ 27.09 (2d ed. 2003).
29. Id.
30. See id. § 27.10.
31.

LOuis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT

62 (1933) (discussing the ability of available public information to prevent social harms);
see also Cox & HAZEN, supra note 28, § 27.10 n.5 (using this quote to explain the
disclosure approach of the Securities Act).
32. COx & HAZEN, supra note 28, § 27.10.
33. Note, however, that when the Securities Act was passed, the SEC did not exist.
Id. § 27.09. Instead, the Federal Trade Commission performed these functions. Id. The
SEC was substituted as the primary regulator of securities markets a year later by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
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with detailed information in a prospectus before issuing securities to
the public.34
The Securities Act, however, only regulates "distributions of
securities."35 A year after its enactment, Congress passed the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),36 which
provided for much broader regulation of the securities markets. The
Exchange Act allows for the regulation of the secondary market and
"regulates all aspects of public trading of securities., 37 Specifically,
the Exchange Act extended federal regulation to "stock
manipulation, insider trading, ... [and] broker-dealer and stock
exchanges as well as proxy solicitations."38
In addition to the distinct substantive scopes of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act, each also provided different jurisdictional
authority. As noted above, the Securities Act originally permitted
plaintiffs to file their claim in either state or federal court and also
prevented defendants from removing claims filed in state court to
federal court.39
In contrast to the concurrent, nonremovable
jurisdiction of Securities Act claims, Exchange Act claims could be
brought only in federal court.40
The reason for this abrupt shift remains unclear. As one
commentator has pointed out:
[T]here is little-if any-legislative history underlying the nonremoval provision of the 1933 Act. The grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction for 1934 Act claims just one year later casts
an even darker shadow.
Indeed, in 1934, Congress
acknowledged the conflict between the non-removal provision
34. Id. § 27.10. For a more thorough discussion of the scope and operation of the
Securities Act, see id. §§ 27.09-27.16 (discussing the general application and function of
the Securities Act).
35. Id. § 27.09; see also 1 LOUiS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
225 (3d ed. 1989) (noting that the Securities Act "is concerned by and large with the initial
distribution of securities rather than with their subsequent trading").
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)). For a more thorough discussion of the scope of the
Exchange Act, see Cox & HAZEN, supra note 28, §§ 27.17-27.19; 1 LOss & SELIGMAN,

supra note 35, at 226 ("The 1934 Act, as initially enacted, had four basic purposes: to
afford a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford
remedies for fraud in securities trading and manipulation of the markets; to regulate the
securities markets; and to control the amount of the Nation's credit that goes into those
markets.").
37. Cox & HAZEN, supra note 28, § 27.09.
38. Id.

39. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 22, 48 Stat. 74, 86 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000)).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000).
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of the 1933 Act and the exclusive federal jurisdiction provision
of the 1934 Act, and even considered an amendment to grant
exclusive federal jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims .... "So far
as the legislative history shows, the difference in these two
related statutes is pure happenstance."'"
The conflict over federal court jurisdiction, however, involves

more than simply the courthouse in which to file. More importantly,
the conflict involves the application of the procedural obligations
imposed on class actions by PSLRA.4 2 PSLRA imposes additional

requirements on class actions that allege violations of the securities
laws, but its requirements apply only in federal court.4 3

During the twentieth century, private securities litigation became
an increasingly important component of securities regulation.
Further, the class action's ability to aggregate many relatively small
claims was "particularly suitable in securities fraud cases, where the

damages to each individual investor may not be substantial enough to
justify incurring the costs of litigation."'
Successful class action
litigants may also receive reasonable attorneys' fees.45 As such, class

actions have become a popular vehicle for asserting violations of the
securities acts.46
However, the class action mechanism is susceptible to abuse,47
and prior to PSLRA, "plaintiffs' law firms filing securities fraud class
actions [had been] accused of a whole host of dubious practices,

including using professional plaintiffs in their cases, filing carbon copy
41. Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the JurisdictionalFramework for Private Rights of
Action Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 632-33 (2006) (citations
omitted) (quoting AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 183 (1969)). Note that Cook's research addresses the
issues raised by this Comment, namely the removal authority of Securities Act claims after
SLUSA. See id. at 623-24. Unlike this Comment, which argues for a broad reading of
removal authority, Cook's article advocates congressional amendment of the removal
provision. See id. at 664-65.
42. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Part III (detailing
Congress's motivation for the enactment of SLUSA).
43. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
44. In re VMS Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 466, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(6), 78u-4(a)(6).
46. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 497-98 (1997) (noting the growth of class actions in securities litigation);
Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicialand Legislative Developments
Affecting the PrivateSecurities FraudClass Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1005-06 (1998)
(noting some reasons for the "increased use of class action[s]" in securities litigation).
47. Evan A. Davis et al., Class Actions, in 7 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES:
TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION § 92.01 (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 2006).
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complaints, and racing to the courthouse to be the first to file a case
before the ink was dry on a company's press release of unexpectedly
weak earnings."48 Further, plaintiffs often filed class action lawsuits,
which, though based on inadequate evidence, were so expensive to
defend that defendant corporations would often settle. 9

Worried about the effect these "strike suits"5

have on

corporations and the investing public, Congress enacted PSLRA.5 1
PSLRA attempted to curb strike suits by enacting heightened
procedural requirements for private class action suits claiming
violations of the securities acts.52 These heightened procedural
requirements include "restrictions on the class representative ...
In addition, PSLRA established
[and] pretrial discovery."53
mandatory Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)54 review of
dismissed claims." The restrictions added by PSLRA, however, apply
only to claims brought in federal court,56 which allowed class actions
48. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 136 (2004).
Interestingly, this article assumes the conclusion argued for in this Comment, noting in a
footnote that SLUSA "wipe[d] out states' concurrent jurisdiction to hear securities fraud
class action suits." Id. at 137 n.10.
49. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
50. Strike suits are suits brought to "extract a sizable settlement from companies that
are forced to settle, regardless of the lack of merits of the suit, simply to avoid the
potentially bankrupting expense of litigation." H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf.
Rep.).
51. The PSLRA Conference Committee report noted that securities litigation reforms
were "prompted by significant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits." H.R. REP.
NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (noting
specifically "(1)

the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities ... whenever

there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying
culpability... ; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants ... ; [and] (3) the abuse of the
discovery process to impose costs" as examples of abuses of private securities lawsuits).
The Conference Committee report also noted that "the investing public and the entire
U.S. economy have been injured by the unwillingness of the best qualified persons to serve
on boards of directors and of issuers to discuss publicly their future prospects, because of
fear of baseless and extortionate securities lawsuits." Id. at 31-32.
52. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION

§ 7.17[1] (5th ed. 2005); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000).
53. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[1].
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (requiring an attorney or unrepresented party to make
certain certifications when filing a document with the court that, if violated, will subject
the certifying party to sanctions).
55. 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[1][F].
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(1) ("The provisions of this subsection [the requirements
added by PSLRA] shall apply to each private action arising under this sub-chapter that is
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
(emphasis added)); see Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05CV316-H, 2005 WL 2592229, at *3
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) ("PSLRA applies to all securities actions pending in federal
court, whether originally filed there or upon removal from state court."); 2 HAZEN, supra

676

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

to avoid PSLRA's requirements by bringing securities claims in state
court.57
Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims
alleging Exchange Act violations, plaintiffs could no longer bring
Exchange Act claims without complying with the requirements of
PSLRA.58 However, in many instances, state securities law and
common law fraud provide remedies similar to those offered under

the Exchange Act. 59 Therefore, class action plaintiffs with Exchange
Act claims could avoid PSLRA's restrictions by filing similar state

securities law or common law fraud claims in state courts.' PSLRA
posed even less of an obstacle to class actions asserting Securities Act
violations because-in contrast to the Exchange Act's grant of
exclusive

federal

court jurisdiction 6 -the

Securities Act

gave

concurrent, nonremovable jurisdiction to state and federal courts.6 2
Further, because Securities Act claims were expressly nonremovable,
plaintiffs asserting violations of the Securities Act could avoid the
requirements of PSLRA by simply filing their federal claims in state
court.63

These two alternatives to federal court threatened to undermine
the effectiveness of PSLRA.
Indeed, reports issued after the
enactment of PSLRA showed that "class action securities fraud
litigation ... declined by about a third in federal courts, but ...

[t]here [was] an almost equal increase in the level of state court"
securities fraud actions. 64 To prevent plaintiffs from circumventing

note 52, § 7.17[2] ("The class action procedural reforms of [PSLRA] appl[y] only to class
actions ... in federal court.").
57. 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[2].
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
59. 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[2] (noting the overlapping remedies provided by
state law and federal law).
60. See Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 32-33 (2d
Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
62. Id. § 77v(a). For a more thorough discussion of concurrent jurisdiction, see
generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal
Courts for Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C. L. REV. 707
(1982).
63. See Dabit,395 F.3d at 32-33; 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[2].
64. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting Joseph A.
Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience
(Stan. L. Sch. Sec. Class Action Clearinghouse, Release No. 97-1, Feb. 27, 1997),
http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/19970227firstyr-firstyr.html).
For a more
thorough account of "federal flight," including a discussion of critics of this theory, see
infra note 183.
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PSLRA, Congress enacted SLUSA,6 5 which attempted to move most
class actions alleging securities fraud to the federal courts, where
6
PSLRA applies. 1

To make federal court the primary venue for securities fraud
class actions, SLUSA first precluded,67 in § 16(b), "covered class
actions" 68 that allege state-law claims based on securities fraud, thus
forcing plaintiffs to allege federal claims.69 Second, SLUSA amended
both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act by including a grant of
removal authority. 70 However, some courts have read the removal
authority to extend only to those state-law claims that are precluded

by § 16(b).7 ' Such an interpretation makes sense in the context of
Exchange Act claims because of the exclusive federal court
jurisdiction over such claims. 72 However, in the context of Securities
Act claims with concurrent, nonremovable jurisdiction, limiting
removal authority to precluded state-law claims creates the "upsidedown effect ' 73 where judges remand class actions alleging federal
Securities Act violations back to state courts.74
This narrow

interpretation of removal authority contradicts the stated intent of
Congress to subject securities fraud class actions to PSLRA.75
Three factors magnify the importance of such a result. First,
federal law prevents appellate review of district court decisions to
65. See infra Part III.
66. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[1][F].
67. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2150 n.1 (2006) ("The preclusion
provision is often called a preemption provision; the Act, however, does not itself displace
state law with federal law but makes some state-law claims nonactionable through the
class action device in federal as well as state court." (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1514 (2006))).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A) (2000) (defining a "'covered class action' " as a lawsuit
with more than "50 prospective class members"). For a thorough discussion of "covered
class actions" under SLUSA and the relationship with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
see 9 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 4166-73.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1). Note that SLUSA's preclusion and removal
provisions also apply only to suits involving "covered securities." Id. §§ 77p, 78bb(f).
Stated broadly, "covered securities" are those which are "nationally traded." Jennifer
O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If It Looks
Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities
Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 341 (2004); see also § 77r.
70. See infra note 127.
71. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
73. Andrew J. Morris & Fatima A. Goss, Why Claims Under the Securities Act of 1933
Are Removable to Federal Court,36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 626, 626 (Apr. 5, 2004).
74. Indeed, the theory has been called the "paradox theory" because it is based on
"the theory that SLUSA moved state-law cases to federal court but left federal-law cases
in state court." Id.
75. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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This removes PSLRA's protections

without immediate review by a higher court.77 Second, a district court
split, which is unlikely to be resolved due to lack of appellate review,
may encourage forum shopping. For example, the Southern District
of Texas disagrees with the Northern District of Texas on whether to

remand class actions alleging pure Securities Act claims.7 8 The
Northern District of Texas denied a motion to remand a case alleging

only Securities Act violations, thus permitting the case to remain in
federal court where it would be subject to PSLRA. However, the

Southern District remanded a similar Securities Act claim. Without
the higher appellate authority to unify these decisions, future
plaintiffs would simply file in a state court where remand would be to

the Southern District. Extending this concept on a national scale,
once plaintiffs determine which district courts remand and which do
not, plaintiffs will simply file in the district courts that will remand
Securities Act cases to state courts. Contrary to the goals of
SLUSA, 79 this would ultimately provide plaintiffs with the sole choice
of whether PSLRA's limitations will apply. Finally, the increasing

scrutiny of publicly held companies after the failures of Enron ° and
WorldCom 8 -and the corresponding increases both in number of

76. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (stating that "an order remanding a case to the State court
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise"); Kircher v. Putnam
Trust Funds, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2153 (2006); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423
U.S. 336, 343 (1976).
77. The federal court's decision is not given preclusive effect as to the merits of the
case. Kircher, 126 S. Ct. at 2157. The Court in Kircher held that even though the decision
to remand by the federal district court "coincide[d] entirely with the merits of the federal
question[,] it is only the forum designation that is conclusive." Id. Thus, after remand by
the federal court, the state court could dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction even though
the federal court had previously held that the state court had exclusive jurisdiction. As the
Court in Kircher explained: " '[C]ontemporary principles of collateral estoppel ...
strongly militat[e] against giving a [non-reviewable judgment] preclusive effect.' " Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 (1980)).
Despite this, PSLRA's protections, such as mandatory rule 11(b) review, do not apply in
state court, and corporate defendants might feel pressure to settle, thereby sustaining the
evil that Congress sought to cure through SLUSA.
78. Alkow v. TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2378-K, 2003 WL 21056750, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
May 8, 2003) (denying the motion to remand a Securities Act class action); In re Waste
Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 595 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (granting the motion to
remand a Securities Act class action).
79. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
80. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron's Collapse: The Overview;
Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al.
81. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom's Collapse: The Overview; Worldcom
Filesfor Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al.
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82 claims brought and the settlement amounts of those claims
heightens the urgency of finding SLUSA's proper interpretation so
that judicial resources can focus on meritorious cases.

82. Michael C. Tu, Ten Years After the Reform Act: Trends in Securities Class Action
Trials, 19 Sec. Reform Act Litig. Rep. (Computer Law Reporter, Inc.) 475, 478 (July
2005); Sheri Qualters, Shareholder Suits Down, But a New Wave May Be Near, BOSTON
BUS. J., Jan. 20, 2006, http://albany.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2006/01/23/news
column3.html (noting a decrease in suits in 2005, but citing one securities lawyer as saying
that "case filings aren't driven by the amount of actual fraud"). Qualters' article suggests
that a securities lawsuit may be provoked simply by the filing of an earnings restatement.
Id.; see also Rudolph F. Pierce & Richard J. Rosensweig, The "Other" Costs of Securities
Class Action Settlements, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Oct/27/133622.html (last visited
Dec. 13, 2006) ("It is no secret that the costs of settling securities class actions are high and
continue to rise .... [I]n 1995, the average class action settlement was under $7 million;
by 2003 the average exceeded $25 million."). Pierce and Rosensweig also note that the
financial costs "represent only part of the equation," explaining that recent settlements
have been imposing nonmonetary penalties as well that may be "equally or more
disruptive," like compulsory "changes in the board of directors." Id. Specifically, they
argue that "[t]he result of these new governance focused settlements may be that the costs
associated with class action settlements-long perceived as exhorbitant [sic] in and of
themselves will be only part of the overall expense for companies that get sued in
securities class actions." Id.; see also John E. Black, Jr. & David T. Burrowes, D&O
Litigation Trends in 2004, IRMI.COM, Feb. 2004, http://www.irmi.com/expert/Articles/
2004[BlackO2.aspx#8 (noting that "securities fraud suits... [increased] from 122 in 1996 to
224 in 2003" and that "the average settlement increased from $7.0 million in 1996 to $24.3
million in 2002 and the median settlement increased from $3.5 million to $6 million"
(footnotes omitted)). Although settlement costs seem to be consistently rising in the longterm, some research suggests that 2006 may see fewer claims and smaller settlement costs
per filing than recent years:
Securities class action has decreased noticeably in the first half of 2006 .... Total
market capitalization losses associated with filings in the first half of 2006 also
decreased substantially from the already reduced levels observed in 2005.... The
annualized Maximum Dollar Losses (MDL) in the first half of 2006 amounted to
$255 billion, a 44 percent decline from 2005, and the annualized Disclosure Dollar
Losses (DDL) amounted to $45 billion, a 55 percent decline from 2005.... In our
2005 Year in Review publication, we suggested that the lower level of litigation
activity in 2005 could be related to a combination of three factors. First, the
dramatic boom and bust of U.S. equities in late 1990s-early 2000s is now
sufficiently far in the past that the large majority of lawsuits relating to fraud
during that period are behind us. Second, it is also possible that improvements in
corporate governance following high publicity filings and settlements such as
Enron and WorldCom, along with the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,
have influenced the number of filings. Third, the U.S. stock market became less
volatile in 2005 than at any time since 1996. Because volatility is an important
determinant of the likelihood of securities litigation, lower volatility tends to be
associated with lower number of filings. With the exception of a modest pickup in
volatility in May and June 2006, these three factors remained in place in the first
half of 2006.
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS: 2006 MID-YEAR
ASSESSMENT 2 (2006), http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouseresearch/2005_YIR/
2006FilingsMidYearRelease.pdf; see also Alan B. Krueger, Accounting for Bad Apples:
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II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE

A.

SL USA's Removal Authority and the DistrictCourt Split

The district courts disagree over the relationship between the
nonremoval provision of the Securities Act and the removal provision
added by SLUSA. Section 22, the nonremoval provision, provides
that "no case arising under this title and brought in any State court...
shall be removed to any court of the United States."8 3 SLUSA,
however, modified § 22's prohibition against removal by adding the
following italicized text: "except as provided in section 16 no case
arising under this title and brought in any State court ...shall be
removed"' to federal court.85 SLUSA also added the following
provisions to § 16 of the Securities Act:
(b) Class action limitations. No covered class action based
upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision
thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any
private party alleging(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security;
or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.
(c) Removal of covered class actions. Any covered class action
brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set
forth in subsection (b), shall be removable to the Federal
district court for the district in which the action is pending, and
shall be subject to subsection (b).86
The conflict over the scope of SLUSA's removal authority arises
from the ambiguity of the above language in § 16. Specifically, the
removal provision, § 16(c), cites the preclusion provision, § 16(b).
Thus, because § 16(c) allows removal of securities "as set forth in
subsection (b)," and because § 16(b) addresses only class actions
Investors in the Stock Market Render Their Verdicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at C2
(noting investor reaction to accounting scandals); S.E.C. to Consider Disclosureof Mutual
Funds' Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at C15 (noting that "investor confidence
[was] shaken" by accounting scandals like Enron and Worldcom).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101,
112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000)).
86. § 101, 112 Stat. at 3228 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(p) (2000))
(emphasis added).
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"based upon the statutory or common law of any State," some district

courts have held that § 16(c) only authorizes removal of class actions
alleging a state-law claim, therefore, remanding the class actions
alleging only Federal Securities Act claims to state court.8 7

On the surface, this argument seems very plausible. If § 16(b)
modifies the entirety of § 16(c), then removal authority should not
extend to Federal Securities Act claims. However, this Comment
argues for an interpretation of § 16(c) that reads the reference to

§ 16(b) not as a limitation on the types of claims that may be
removed, but as an express inclusion of state-law class actions in a
larger category of claims that may be removed to federal court. This
approach-similar to that reached by the District Court for the

Northern District of Texas 88-provides the reading of the statute most
consistent with that intended by Congress and also reconciles
otherwise conflicting subsections of the statute. Furthermore, a
broad reading comports with the Supreme Court's mandate that, in
the area of statutory construction, courts should not proceed "by a
single sentence, or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object."89

87. See, e.g., Irra v. Lazard Ltd., No. 05 CV 3388 RJDRML, 2006 WL 2375472, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); Zia v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1309
(S.D. Fla. 2004); In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (D.N.H.
2004); Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03cv0714
BTM(JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003); Martin v.
BellSouth Corp., No. 03-CV-728-WBH, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2003); Nauheim v.
Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *17 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 15, 2003); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
88. Alkow v. TXU Corp., No.3:02-CV-2738-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *1
(N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) (stating that "the reference in [§ 16(c)] to subsection (b) includes
state-law class actions among the cases that may be removed, but does not limit removal to
just those cases"). The Western District of North Carolina reached the same conclusion
that remand was improper, but noted that "[s]ection 16(b) does not narrow the scope of
cases removable under section 16(c), except in its preemption of certain state law claims
that might otherwise be removed." Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05CV316-H, 2005 WL
2592229, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005). Some defendants have also argued that the
provision, "as set forth in subsection (b)," does not modify the phrase "covered class
action," but only the phrase "involving a covered security" in an effort to clarify that the
provision only covers securities involving fraud. See In re Tyco Int'l, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 119
(summarizing the defendant's argument); In re Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 595
(noting that the defendants raised this argument).
89. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1990) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
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PlainLanguage?

Although the difficulty of interpreting the statute is implicit in
the growing district court split9" over the issue, courts and
commentators on both sides explicitly note the difficulty of
ascertaining an accurate interpretation.9 In Brody v. Homestore,
Inc.,92 the District Court for the Central District of California stated
that the statute was "inartfully (or even inaccurately) worded," but
refused to grant a motion to remand a Securities Act claim to state
court.

93

The Southern District of California 94 also acknowledged the
"seeming inconsistency between the plain language of [§ 16(c)] and
[§ 22(a)]," but remanded the case to state court. 95 Ironically, the

Southern District of California remanded the case to state court
96
because it determined that the "language of the statute is clear.

Other cases, while not explicitly noting the statute's ambiguity,
implicitly do so by using two to three pages to interpret the "plain
meaning" of the statute.97 One commentator, arguing for removal of

pure Securities Act claims, noted that "the removal provision's
reference to the preemption provision is not a model of clarity."98

Another commentator, arguing for nonremoval, noted the ambiguity
90. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
91. Note that the party arguing that removal jurisdiction is appropriate has the burden
of proving it. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921). Additionally,
removal jurisdiction is strictly construed against the party arguing for removal. Shamrock
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1921).
92. 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
93. Id. at 1123. This interpretation was criticized by the district court in Nauheim.
Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *14
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2003). The court in Nauheim stated that "[u]nder the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute, as amended by SLUSA, such an action [based solely
on federal law] cannot be removed from state court." Id. at *17. The Eastern District of
Tennessee agreed with the Brody court's description of the statute. In re King Pharm.,
Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) ("The Brody court recognized that SLUSA,
although inartfully worded, was enacted to ensure that securities class litigation would be
conducted in federal court.").
94. Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp, No. 03cv0714
BTM(JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23,2003).
95. Id. at *6. Another commentator has also noted the seeming contradiction. Jordan
A. Costa, Note, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims After SLUSA: What Congress
Changed, and What it Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1193, 1211 (2004) ("[T]he court
directly contradicted itself by calling the statute 'clear' and by simultaneously recognizing
the 'inconsistency' in its language."). For a more thorough discussion of the inconsistency
between § 22(a) and § 16(c), see infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
96. Haw. StructuralIronworkers, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *6.
97. See, e.g., In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H.
2004).
98. Morris & Goss, supra note 73, at 626.
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of the statute in nearly identical terms, stating that "the provisions are
far from a model of legislative clarity."99 Thus, the confusion in the
district courts is understandable. However, as demonstrated in the

following Section, the language of the statute supports the broad
reading of § 16(c)'s removal authority.
C.

The Statutory Argument

The broad reading of the removal authority is internally
consistent with the statute as a whole, creating a result closer to that
envisioned by Congress.1"
Three primary statutory arguments
support the broad reading. The first two arguments examine specific
provisions of the statute, and the third demonstrates that only the
broad reading explains SLUSA's amendment to both the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. First, the narrow reading ignores the
"except" clause that SLUSA added to § 22 of the Securities Act. 101
Second, the narrow reading creates redundancy in the use of the term
"covered class action" in both § 16(c) and § 16(b). °2 Finally,
Congress could have achieved the narrow reading without amending
the Securities Act at all; the broad reading, however, gives meaning to

this amendment.
First, the broad reading explains the meaning of the "except"

clause in § 22. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act confers concurrent
jurisdiction to state and federal courts and further provides that "no
case arising under this title and brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United

99. Costa, supra note 95, at 629.
100. See infra Part III.
101. See Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122,1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Alkow
v. TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 8,
2003) ("In other words, claims arisingunder the [Securities] Act are removable as provided
in [§ 16(c)]. If [§ 16(c)] applies only to state-law claims as the Alkows claim, then no
claims arising under the 1933 Act would be removable, and the exception language in
[§ 22(a)] would be meaningless."). But see In re Tyco Int'l, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 120
(rejecting the argument that if § 16(c) "authorizes the removal only of cases that are based
on state law, Congress would not have needed to amend [§ 22(a)] to create an exception
for cases that are removable under [§ 16(c)] because [§ 22(a)] applies only to claims that
arise under the Securities Act"); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590,
595-96 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (rejecting the argument that applying the removal clause to statelaw claims only would make the except clause in § 22(a) pointless).
102. See In re Tyco Int'l, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 120 n.8 (noting that the defendants raised
this argument, but stating that "[w]hile ... § 77p(c) could have been drafted without these
terms because they are already included in § 77p(b), it is understandable that Congress
would have wanted to emphasize that, like the rest of SLUSA, § 77p(c) was intended to
apply only to covered class actions that involve covered securities").
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States."1 °3 SLUSA amended § 22(a) by adding the phrase "except as
provided in section 16(c)" 1°1 to qualify both the concurrent
jurisdiction and nonremovability of claims.1 5 However, § 22(a)
applies only to "offenses and violations under [the Securities Act]."1 °6
Thus, the "except" clause is unnecessary to create removal authority
for state-law claims. To put it another way, if § 16(c) were truly
meant to permit the removal of only state-law claims, then it would be
illogical for the jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act, which
applies only to federal claims, to contain an exception for state-law
claims that would never come under the scope of the Act.'0 7 Thus,
the narrow reading, which allows removal of only the precluded statelaw claims, would create inconsistency between § 16(c) and § 22(a) of
the Securities Act and would impute to Congress the intent to draft
an unneeded amendment to § 22(a). Indeed, the absence of any
explanation of such an awkward result in the legislative history makes
the narrow reading even more doubtful.
The broad reading of § 16(c) eliminates this confusion and
provides a more intelligible explanation of the "except" clause.
Specifically, under the broad reading, individual claims alleging
violations of the Securities Act would continue to enjoy concurrent,
nonremovable jurisdiction." 8 However, the "except" clause in § 22(a)
would allow defendants to remove a subset of those claims-those
brought by "covered class actions"-to federal court. Because
PSLRA's procedural requirements apply only in federal court, only
the broad reading of removal authority is consistent with the
legislative intent to revitalize PSLRA's restrictions on class actions.
Thus, the broad reading gives meaning to Congress's amendment to
the nonremoval clause of § 22(a)-a meaning that reflects the intent
to revitalize PSLRA.
One court "reject[ed] this argument [for the broad reading]
because it is based on the mistaken premise that a case cannot both
arise under the Securities Act and be based on state law."' 9 The
court in In re Tyco International argued that a claim may arise

103. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
104. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101,
112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)).
105. Id.
106. § 77v(a).
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
108. § 77p(c) (extending removal authority only to "covered class actions").
109. In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.N.H. 2004)
(emphasis added).
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simultaneously under both the Securities Act and state law. 110 The
possibility of overlapping federal and state claims, the court argued,
explains the purpose of the "except" clause for state-law claims."1
This reading suggests that the "except" clause of § 22(a) merely
ensures removal of those state claims that may overlap with an
otherwise nonremovable Securities Act claim.
However, careful examination of this argument reveals
fundamental flaws. The argument recognizes that claims can arise
under both federal and state law, but would allow defendants to
remove the complaint only when the plaintiff expressly pleads the
state claim." 2 Under this interpretation, the class action plaintiff has
two overlapping remedies-one under federal law and one under
state law-but the removal provision of § 16(c) applies only if the
plaintiff explicitly alleges the state-law claim. In direct contradiction
to the stated purpose of SLUSA,"13 this would give plaintiffs sole
choice of forum, and, thus, choice of whether PSLRA's restrictions
apply.
To put it another way, if § 16(c)'s removal authority extends only
to state claims-those which are immediately precluded by § 16(b)plaintiffs would have no incentive to include such claims. Plaintiffs
suffer no loss by excluding precluded claims. Thus, plaintiffs could
choose the forum with impunity. Congress enacted SLUSA with the
explicit purpose of preventing class action plaintiffs from
circumventing PSLRA. 114 An interpretation of SLUSA that would
allow class action plaintiffs claiming violations of the Securities Act to
avoid PSLRA by simply excluding a precluded claim conflicts with
Congress's intent."'
Further, nothing in the legislative history
110. Id. at 120 nn.6-7.
111. Id.
112. A contrary interpretation would require courts, when hearing a motion to remand,
to perform a searching inquiry into state law to determine whether an overlapping statelaw claim exists. Such an interpretation would create two separate subsets of class action
claims: (1) those alleging violations of the Securities Act that also could be brought under
an applicable state law; and (2) those alleging violations of the Securities Act that could
not also be brought under an applicable state law. This interpretation would then apply
§ 16(c) only to the first subset of claims-those Securities Act claims that could potentially
have an overlapping state-law claim. No court or commentator suggests that this could be
the correct interpretation of the statute.
113. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000)) (stating that one of the
purposes of SLUSA was "to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits
alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995").
114. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
115. See infra Part III.
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indicates the intent to create an exception to SLUSA for a subset of
class actions that are based on Securities Act claims.
The second argument for the broad reading examines the
inconsistency that the narrow reading creates between §§ 16(c) and
16(b). Under the narrow reading, the phrase in § 16(c), "[a]ny
covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered
security, as set forth in subsection (b)," incorporates all of the terms of
§ 16(b).1 16 Indeed, the premise of the narrow reading is that § 16(c)
incorporates the phrase, "[n]o covered class action based upon the
'
statutory or common law of any State."117
However, both § 16(c) and
§ 16(b) have clauses limiting their scope to "covered class actions";
thus, under the narrow reading, the inclusion of "covered class
action" again in § 16(c) is unnecessary.118 To put it another way,
because § 16(b) includes the phrase "covered class action," the
narrow reading of the statute could be achieved more concisely if
§ 16(c) simply read, "Any claim involving a covered security, as set
forth in subsection (b), brought in State court shall be removable,"
instead of the existing text, "Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security."' 19
The broad reading avoids this redundancy.' E Specifically, the
broad reading suggests two independent provisions: § 16(c) sets forth
the requirements for removal while § 16(b) sets forth the
requirements for preclusion. As such, the two sections begin with the
parallel language2 l that one would expect from independent
provisions, each separately including covered class actions. Under
the broad reading, the use of the phrase "as set forth in subsection
(b)" ensures that federal courts determine which actions are
precluded by subsection (b) but does not limit removal to those
claims. Instead, the broad reading would extend removal authority to
any covered class action involving a covered security that alleged
violations of the Securities Act and also those claims precluded by
subsection (b). Only this reading comports with Congress's clear

116. See In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (D.N.H.
2004) (noting that defendants raised this argument, but finding it unpersuasive); In re
Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 595-96 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (rejecting this
argument).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
118. See In re Tyco Int'l, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 120 n.8.
119. § 77p(c) (emphasis added).
120. Id. (rejecting this argument).
121. Id. § 77p(b) ("No covered class action.
); Id. § 77p(c) ("Any covered class
action....").
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intent to grant federal courts broad authority over securities class
actions. 2 '
The final statutory argument examines SLUSA's amendments to
both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and demonstrates that
only the broad reading gives purpose to both sets of amendments.
This argument, however, must be viewed in the context of SLUSA's
goal to prevent circumvention of PSLRA. Plaintiffs wishing to
circumvent PSLRA used different methods to avoid federal court
depending on which Act provided the remedy they sought.2 3

Specifically, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange
Act claims; however, many state securities laws and common law
fraud provide similar remedies. 4 Thus, plaintiffs wishing to allege
Exchange Act violations could often avoid federal court and PSLRA
by filing similar state-law or common law fraud claims.'2 5 However,
plaintiffs wanting to file Securities Act claims could take advantage of
the concurrent, nonremovable jurisdiction and simply file their
Federal Securities Act claim in state court, 26 thus getting around
PSLRA's restrictions. Despite the two different means of avoiding
federal court, Congress amended the two statutes with almost
27
identical language.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Section 16 of the Securities Act states that:

(b) Class action limitations[:] No covered class action based upon the statutory or
common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security;
(c) Removal of covered class actions[:] Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be
removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is
pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b).
15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000).
Section 29(f) of the Exchange Act states that:
(1) Class action limitations[:]
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or
subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any
private party alleging-
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To prevent plaintiffs from filing substitute state claims to avoid
the Exchange Act's exclusive federal jurisdiction, SLUSA added a

provision which precludes "covered class actions" alleging state-law
and common law securities fraud.128 Thus, plaintiffs could no longer

file a state-law claim in state court for securities fraud similar to that
provided by the Exchange Act and thereby circumvent PSLRA.129
However, even though plaintiffs alleging Securities Act violations
could avoid federal court due to the grant of concurrent,

nonremovable jurisdiction and simply file their federal claim in state
court, 3 ' SLUSA amended the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
in an almost identical fashion by providing a clause precluding statelaw securities fraud claims."'
Congress recognized that class actions could avoid PSLRA in the
context of both Exchange Act and Securities Act claims. 3 2 However,
SLUSA-enacted to solve this problem--clearly addressed only the
method that plaintiffs used to avoid PSLRA's amendment to the
Exchange Act; namely, it precluded class actions based on state-law
(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.
(2) Removal of covered class actions[:] Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in paragraph (1), shall be
removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is
pending, and shall be subject to paragraph (1)).
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f).
128. § 77p(b) (preclusion provision in the Securities Act); § 78bb(f)(1) (preclusion
provision in the Exchange Act); see also 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[2] ("Under the
1933 Act's general jurisdiction provision, private actions under sections 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act can be brought in either federal or state court. Additionally, state securities
law and common law fraud were able to provide alternative state court forums for class
action plaintiffs who could thereby avoid the provisions of [PSLRA]. Congress largely
eliminated these alternatives in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998."
(footnotes omitted)). However, SLUSA did provide a few exceptions to this general rule.
For instance, "class actions concerning privately traded securities are not covered by
SLUSA's removal and preclusion provisions." Id. § 7.17[21. In addition, "derivative suits
and suits by individuals" may remain in state court. Id. State class actions are not
precluded, and neither are class actions "seeking to enforce a contractual agreement under
a trust indenture for a debt security." Id. § 7.17[2][A] (citations omitted).
129. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[21.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
131. See supra note 127.
132. SLUSA, designed to prevent plaintiff circumvention of PSLRA, amended both
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
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securities fraud.'33 PSLRA also applied to Securities Act class actions
brought in federal court,'3 4 but plaintiffs wishing to bring these claims
did not have to find a similar state-law claim to avoid federal court.
Instead, class action plaintiffs could file the Securities Act claim in
state court. 3 ' Despite this different method of avoiding federal court,
SLUSA added nearly the same language to the Securities Act as it
added to the Exchange Act. 13 6 The narrow reading suggests that this
language only allows removal of precluded state-law claims and thus
fails to address the method by which class action plaintiffs avoided
PSLRA in the context of Securities Act claims. However, SLUSA
also amended the concurrent, nonremovable jurisdiction provision of
the Securities Act with an "except" clause that references the removal
provision.'37
Further, Congress intentionally amended the Securities Act. The
narrow reading suggests that Congress intended to prevent class
action plaintiffs from circumventing PSLRA only in the context of
Exchange Act claims; however, this reading fails to properly account
for the fact that Congress also amended the Securities Act with the
express intention of preventing circumvention of PSLRA by "private
securities class action[s]."' 38
Ascertaining whether Congress
addressed both causes of this problem-(1) filing state claims and (2)
filing Securities Act claims in state court-depends on one's reading
of SLUSA. The narrow reading suggests that Congress addressed
only the first cause of this problem.
In the context of Securities Act claims, reading SLUSA's
removal authority narrowly leaves the amendment to the Securities
Act superfluous. Under the narrow reading, § 16(b) of the Securities
Act precludes state-law claims based on securities fraud, and § 16(c)
grants removal authority only to those precluded state-law claims.
However, after amendment, § 28(f)(1) of the Exchange Act precludes
state-law claims,"' and § 28(f)(2) grants removal authority to those
precluded claims.140 Thus, the narrow reading suggests that Congress
provided for the removal and preclusion of state-law securities fraud
claims twice.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
134. Id. § 77z-1.
135. Id. § 77v(a).

136. See supra note 127.
137. See supra notes 84-85, 104-05 and accompanying text.
138. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000)).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
140. Id. § 78bb(f)(2).
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Thus, a reading of the removal provision that does not allow
removal of Securities Act claims leaves SLUSA's amendment to the
Securities Act completely unnecessary and ineffectual. The broad
reading, however, gives purpose to the amendment to the Securities
Act by interpreting it to extend removal authority to Securities Act
claims through the "except" clause that it added to the general
nonremoval provision. Thus, the narrow reading creates a redundant
statutory amendment, while the broad reading prevents both
Securities Act class actions and Exchange Act class actions14 1 from
circumventing PSLRA, providing an interpretation more consistent
with congressional intent.
Reading SLUSA's removal provision in the Securities Act to
extend to Securities Act class actions avoids many illogical results that
follow from the narrow reading. As such, this broad reading provides
the most logical and internally consistent interpretation of the statute
as a whole. The district court split, however, demonstrates the
continuing disagreement over the scope of removal authority. The
Supreme Court's decisions also fail to provide a clear answer.
D.

The Supreme Court's Conflicting Guidance

Dicta in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust142 suggest that the
Supreme Court supports the narrow reading of the removal statute,143
but the Court's dicta in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v.
Dabit'4 indicate support for broad removal authority and uniform
national standards.'45 Although Dabit specifically addressed whether
SLUSA's amendment precludes state-law holder claims, 146 language
in the opinion suggests that the Court would support the broad
reading of § 16(c) and extend removal authority to Securities Act
claims. Dabitread SLUSA's preclusion provision broadly by refusing
to interpret the "in connection with a purchase or sale"
requirement14 7 to limit preclusion to claims involving a "purchase or
sale.' 1 48 The Court took this approach despite its decision in Blue
141. Note that the phrasing here may be somewhat misleading as class actions with
Exchange Act violations avoid PSLRA by filing a similar state-law claim, i.e., not the
actual Exchange Act claim. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
142. 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
143. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
144. 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
145. Id. at 1514.
146. Id. at 1515.
147. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 101(b), 112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2000)).
148. Dabit,126 S. Ct.at 1515 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)).
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Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,49 interpreting almost identical
language to impose such a requirement on rule 10b-5 claims. 150
The reasoning in Dabit also suggests support for the broad
reading of § 16(c)'s removal authority. Dabit purported to follow
congressional intent and noted the "congressional preference for
'national standards for securities class action lawsuits.' ""sI The Court
also noted that "[t]he magnitude of the federal interest in protecting
the market for nationally
the integrity and efficient operation 1of
52
traded securities cannot be overstated.'
The presumption that Congress envisioned a broad
construction [of preclusion authority] follows not only from
ordinary principles of statutory construction but also from the
particular concerns that culminated in SLUSA's enactment. A
narrow reading of the statute would undercut the effectiveness
of [PSLRA] and thus run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose,
viz., "to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the
objectives" of the [PSLRA].' 5 3
The congressional language quoted in Dabit also supports the broad
reading of § 16(c)'s removal authority. Indeed, the same concern,
namely the circumvention of PSLRA, demands that Securities Act
claims be litigated in federal court.
In Dabit, the Court also appeared comfortable allowing policy to
dictate statutory interpretation in this area of law, noting that the
Court had previously done so in Blue Chip Stamps.'5 4 Indeed, the
Court highlighted that in Blue Chip Stamps, a seminal rule 10b-5 case,
it had "relied chiefly and candidly, on 'policy considerations.' ""', As
noted later, in Part IV, policy also supports a broad reading of § 16(c).
The Court's decision in Kircher, handed down just four months
later, seems to conflict both with Dabit's reliance on congressional
intent as an interpretive tool in construing SLUSA and its
endorsement of a federal system of securities regulation. Kircher, like
Dabit,involved a class action holder claim.'56 The plaintiffs in Kircher
149. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
150. Id. at 747-51 (interpreting rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2006)). Rule 10b5 and its statutory counterpart, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000), provide the basis for federal law
claims alleging securities fraud.
151. Dabit, 126 S Ct. at 1514 (quoting § 2(5), 112 Stat. at 3227).
152. Id. at 1509.
153. Id. at 1513 (quoting § 2(5), 112 Stat. at 3227).
154. See id. at 1510, 1512 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723).
155. Id. at 1512.
156. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 2150 (2006).
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had received a favorable decision from the district court, which ruled
that SLUSA did not preclude holder claims. The defendants filed a
notice of appeal and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
overturned the district court's decision and precluded the claim.157
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
However, before the plaintiffs reached the Supreme Court, the
Court handed down its decision in Dabit, which-unlike the district
court in Kircher-held that SLUSA's preclusion provision applies to
holder claims. 158 Defeated substantively, the plaintiffs argued that,
regardless of whether the district court misinterpreted the law, the
defendants had no right to appeal the decision. 159 The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that decisions to remand cannot be appealed, even if,
as in Kircher, the district court misinterprets the statute. 16°
Contrary to Dabit, language in Kircher suggests that the Court
would adopt the narrow reading of SLUSA's removal provision in the
context of federal claims brought under the Securities Act.
Specifically, the Court in Kircher noted that its decision in Dabit
suggested "that a 'key provision of the [Act] makes all "covered class
actions" filed in state court removable.' ,161 However, the Court
clarified this language in Kircher by stating, "We sketched the
removal provisions in broad strokes then because the question of its
scope was not before us. Now that it is, we speak more cautiously."' 62
The Court further stated, "[W]e read authorization for the removal in
[§ 16(c) as being] ... confined to cases 'set forth in [§ 16(b)],' ...
'
namely those with claims of untruth, manipulation, and so on,"163
and
it specifically declared, "In sum, we see no reason to reject the
straightforward reading:
removal and jurisdiction to deal with
removed cases is limited to those precluded by the terms of subsection
(b)."' 6 Thus, in Kircher, the Court seemed to read the amendment of
the Securities Act narrowly to extend removal authority only to statelaw claims.
As the Court noted, its reading in Kircher contradicts its
reasoning in Dabit. If courts interpret SLUSA narrowly so as to
157. Id. at 2151-52.
158. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at 1515.
159. Kircher, 126 S. Ct. at 2151-52; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) and the general restriction against appealing
decisions to remand).
160. Kircher, 126 S. Ct. at 2154.
161. Id. at 2154 n.11 (emphasis added) (quoting Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at 1512 n.7).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2154.
164. Id. at 2155 (emphasis added).
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remand Securities Act class actions to state court, then the federal
statute will be subjected to conflicting state interpretations, thereby
defeating the uniformity of "national standards" endorsed by Dabit.65
However, because Kircher did not need to address the removal
provision in the context of Securities Act claims, it did not fully
explain its rationale and reconcile this patent conflict. Because policy
favors a federal system of securities regulation and protection of
corporations from strike suits, 16 6 the Court's broad policy language in
Dabit-supporting the broad reading of removal authority-may be
more indicative of the Court's view of securities laws generally than
its specific statutory analysis in Kircher, which seems to support the
narrow reading.'67 Thus, Dabit remains instructive to district courts
addressing whether to remand Securities Act claims. In light of the
statutory arguments supporting removal of federal claims, 6 the
Court could conceivably abandon its dicta in Kircher and construe the
removal provision in the Securities Act to cover Securities Act claims.
Such a reading is also more consistent with the congressional intent of
SLUSA.
III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The Supreme Court has noted for the past century that
'nothing is better settled, than that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and ...
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.' ",169 The legislative history
of SLUSA indicates that Congress intended to enact a broad statute
that provides for removal of pure Securities Act claims. The Central
District of California, sensitive to the importance of legislative intent,
noted that " '[t]he purpose of [SLUSA] is to prevent plaintiffs from
seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against
abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather than in Federal,
court.' "170 Indeed, Congress expressly set forth its goal in enacting
SLUSA in the "Findings" section of the Act:

165. See Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at 1509 (stating that "[t]he magnitude of the federal interest
in protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the market for nationally traded
securities cannot be overstated"); supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166. See infra Part IV.
167. Kircher, 126 S. Ct. at 2155.
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 707 n.9 (2000) (quoting In re Chapman,
166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897)).
170. Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting
144 CONG. REC. H11,019, 11,020 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (Conference Report)).
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[I]n order to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the
objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, it is appropriate to enact national standardsfor securities
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while
preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State
securities regulators171and not changing the current treatment of
individual lawsuits.
Thus, while Congress did intend to protect some enforcement powers
of the states, the "Findings" section suggests that Congress's primary
concern was enacting national standards for class actions and
preventing circumvention of PSLRA. 17 2
The House Committee on Commerce specifically noted the
problem of PSLRA circumvention in its report on the bill. 173 The
Committee then added that "[t]he solution to this problem is to make
Federal court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class action
litigation.' 1 74 Indeed, the record is replete with references to the
establishment of federal standards for subject securities. 75 Testifying
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, Representative Anna G. Eshoo echoed this goal of
establishing federal courts, with the procedural protections of
PSLRA, as the exclusive venue for securities fraud cases: "Migration
to State courts is not a minor problem.... This is because [PSLRA]
relies on uniform application and enforcement of the law to be
effective. Without this uniform standard, the law is undermined, the
continue and companies and investors are held
strike suits
76
hostage."1
Other congressional comments also suggest that Congress
intended to enact an amendment granting broad removal authority.
Senator Phil Gramm, a cosponsor of the bill, noted, "What our bill
171. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000)) (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998).
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 8950, 8971 (1998) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (noting that
SLUSA "is intended to create a uniform national standard for securities fraud class
actions involving nationally-traded securities"); id. at 8987 (statement of Sen. Domenici)
(stating that SLUSA "createfs] one set of rules for securities fraud cases"); id. at 8973
(statement of Senator Reed) (noting that "this Act will preempt this circumvention,
creating a national standard for class action suits involving nationally traded securities").
176. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearingson S. 1260 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 105th
Cong. 7 (1997) (opening statement of Rep. Anna G. Eshoo).
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does is very simply this. It sets national standards for stocks that are
traded on the national markets. What it says is that in the case of
class-action suits ...if a stock is traded on the national market ...
then the ...suit has to be filed in Federal court.' 1 77 Speaking before
the House of Representatives, Representative Tom Bliley noted that
"lawsuits alleging violations that involve securities that are offered
nationally belong in Federal court."178 Representative Bliley also
noted that "[t]his legislation ...will eliminate State court as a venue
for meritless securities litigation." '79
Voicing his opposition to the bill, Senator Tim Johnson also
indicated that he read the legislation consistently with the broad
reading, which forces class action plaintiffs to meet PSLRA's
Johnson
argued
that
specifically,
Senator
requirements;
"[p]reempting state remedies now-and requiring fraud victims to
seek relief solely under the federal standards promulgated in 1995could leave investors with severely limited ability to protect
themselves against fraud.' 18 1 Interestingly, nowhere did a Senator
note an exemption from the removal authority for class actions
alleging violations of only the Securities Act. Such an awkward
exception to the implementation of "federal standards" would surely
have been mentioned.
Senator Feinstein's comments, however, may provide the most
explicit congressional endorsement for the broad reading of SLUSA
which extends removal authority to federal claims. She noted that
SLUSA would create "uniform national standards in securities fraud
class action suits." '8 1 More importantly, Senator Feinstein directly
alludes to the fact that the removal authority created by the Act
extends to federal (i.e., Securities Act) claims 'and not just state-law
claims. Specifically, she stated that without the authority to remove
claims to federal court, corporations "whose securities are traded
throughout the fifty states182could face liability under federal securities
'
laws in fifty state courts."
177. 143 CONG. REC. 21,354, 21,355 (1997) (emphasis added).
178. 144 CONG. REC. 26,537, 26,537 (1998) (emphasis added).

179. Id.
180. 144 CONG. REC. 8950, 8970 (1998) (emphasis added).

181. Id. at 8969.
182. Id. (emphasis added). One student commentator brushed off the relevance of
these statements, concluding that Senator Feinstein's "reading of [SLUSA] ... is
erroneous." Costa, supra note 95, at 1221. As a general matter, Costa argues that, despite
repeated statements of members of Congress indicating the need for national standards in
securities fraud litigation, and in a bill whose primary purpose was to remove most class
actions to federal courts, the Republican Congress's strong commitment to federalism
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Congress enacted SLUSA to ensure compliance with PSLRA.
Indeed, in enacting SLUSA, Congress specifically noted SLUSA's
purpose "to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. " 83 As such, the
goals of each are inextricably intertwined and the scope of SLUSA
should be examined in light of PSLRA's reach. As noted in the
"Findings" section of the Act,"8
Congress designed SLUSA to
prevent class action plaintiffs from easily sidestepping PSLRA's

restrictions by filing in state court. PSLRA attempted to prevent
abusive strike suits by adding procedural limitations to both the
prevented it from allowing removal of the small sliver of complaints comprised of pure
Securities Act claims, and thus created an anomalous subset of claims which are
unfavorable to big businesses. Id. at 1223 ("[The] Republican majority [in both houses]
was generally concerned with federalism, and with 'returning authority to the states.'
[And a]s a general proposition, proposed legislation which contracted the authority of
state judiciary in favor of augmenting that of the federal judiciary was unpopular in this
political climate." (citations omitted)).
183. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000)); see 144 CONG. REC.
16,425, 16,437 (1998) (noting a "6000 percent increase" in state securities class actions
filings after the passage of the PSLRA); see also Grundfest & Perino, supra note 64
(noting an increase in state court cases that closely mirrors the decrease in federal cases
brought following passage of PSLRA); Allan Horwich, The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act Has Begun to Achieve Its Purpose, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC.
ELEC. AGE 4, Nov. 1999, available at 3 No. 6 GLWSLAW 4 ("Some members of the
plaintiffs' securities bar sought to avoid the burdens imposed by the PSLRA by shifting
their focus, to the extent possible, to state-law claims in state courts."). The Conference
report cited the findings of Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, which showed
that after enactment of PSLRA, federal class actions alleging securities fraud were down
by a third, while state fraud securities class actions increased proportionately. H.R. REP.
No. 105-803, at 14-15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (citing Grundfest & Perino, supra note 64). The
Conference report referred to this as the "substitution effect." Id. It has also been
referred to as "federal flight." See Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
395 F.3d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006); Spielman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2003). However, findings that
PSLRA actually created "federal flight" are disputed. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 35, 4167 n.117 ("The rationale for this legislation rests on a misconception of the
facts.... In fact, every empirical study of securities fraud class actions filings reaches the
same conclusion; while State court securities filings may have increased in 1996, they
decreased in 1997." (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 12 (1997) (emphasis added))). For a
thorough overview of the studies contradicting the findings cited before Congress
regarding flight to state courts, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm:
Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9
nn.31-33 (1998). Regardless of the accuracy of the studies detailing flight to state courts,
the "Findings" section of the Act conclusively establishes that Congress relied on their
accuracy in enacting SLUSA. § 2, 112 Stat. at 3227 (stating that "since enactment of that
legislation, considerable evidence has been presented to Congress that a number of
securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts").
184. § 2, 112 Stat. at 3227.
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Securities Act and the Exchange Act."' Only an interpretation of
SLUSA that provides for the removal of class actions alleging
Securities Act violations prevents class actions from circumventing
PSLRA and is, therefore, consistent with congressional intent. That
is, because Congress enacted SLUSA to prevent circumvention of
PSLRA, SLUSA should be interpreted in connection with PSLRA's
intended reach. Because PSLRA applies to Securities Act claims
only when brought in federal court, SLUSA only fully prevents
PSLRA circumvention by class actions if the removal provision
extends to federal claims.
The court in Alkow v. TXU Corp.186 examined a class action
plaintiff's argument that a pure Securities Act claim should be
remanded and noted that SLUSA was "drafted precisely to prevent
18 7
the[se] type[s] of tactics employed ... to avoid federal court.,
However, Judge Barbadoro, in In re Tyco International, reached a
contrary conclusion but noted that he did not
attempt ...to determine what Congress might have done if it
had been asked to decide whether cases that are based
exclusively on the Securities Act should be removable to
federal court. Instead, .. . [he] made a contextual examination
of the statutory language and a careful review of legislative
history to determine the meaning of the statute that Congress
actually passed. 88
Contrary to Judge Barbadoro's opinion, reading the legislative
history in combination with the statutory language of SLUSA reveals
that Congress intended to pass, and did pass, a statute which allowed
defendants to remove claims brought solely under the Securities Act.
Congress enacted SLUSA to revitalize PSLRA, which it felt was
necessary to protect investors and the integrity of the securities
market. 8 9 Only a reading of SLUSA's removal authority that extends
to claims alleging violations of the Securities Act achieves this
objective.
185. Dabit demonstrates the Supreme Court's sensitivity to congressional concerns
regarding the circumvention of PSLRA, which motivated SLUSA's enactment. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1513 (2006) ("A narrow
reading of the statute['s preclusion provision] would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995
Reform Act and thus run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose, viz., 'to prevent certain
State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the
objectives' of the 1995 Act.").
186. No. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 2003 WL 21056750 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2003).
187. Id. at *2.
188. In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H. 2004).
189. See supra notes 51, 171, 176 and accompanying text.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A BROAD READING
Interpreting SLUSA in light of the legislative history suggests
that the removal provision in § 16(c) applies to class actions alleging
Securities Act claims. Not only is this an accurate reading, but it also
furthers Congress's goal of protecting defendants by decreasing
vexatious strike suits 1"
and therefore protects investors.
Furthermore, a broad reading helps protect market integrity, thereby
advancing an efficient capital market.19 1 Federal law "has long been
the principal vehicle for asserting class-action securities fraud
claims. '' " Only after the enactment of PSLRA did class actions
alleging securities fraud appear with any regularity in state court.1 93
"This is hardly a situation, then, in which a federal statute has
eliminated a historically entrenched state-law remedy."'9 4 Moreover,
a broad reading of § 16(c) has the secondary effect of encouraging
independent claims by institutional investors.
A.

Preventing Strike Suits and Creatingan Uniform Interpretationof
FederalSecurities Laws

PSLRA increases "the cost and time associated with filing" class
actions in federal court. 95 Indeed, one commentator noted that after
PSLRA, a covered class action "may take ... three years to arrive at
a posture that exists for an individual state court case with state
causes of action the day after it is filed.' 19 6 Senator Pete Domenici,
remarking on the move from federal to state courts, stated that
PSLRA may have "worked too well."' 9

190.
191.
(noting
192.
193.
194.

Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at 1510-11.
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31
that PSLRA's protections help protect the integrity of the market).
Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at 1514 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)).
Id. at 1515.
Id.

195. Jonathan F. Mack, PSLRA and SLUSA: Laws with Unintended Consequences,
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM:

SEC. ELEC. AGE 1,

Nov. 2003, available at 7 No. 6

GLWSLAW 1.

196. Id. Mack's article specifically notes the following as contributors to the delay: "a
90-day notice period for class members to apply for status as a provisional class
representative," the "selection process," "filing of the mass compliant," "motions to
dismiss," frequent "repleading," "certification motions," and initial discovery. Id.
197. 144 CONG. REC. 8950, 8987 (1998). The Senator further stated that "because of
[the] more stringent pleading requirements, plaintiffs' lawyers no longer 'race to the
courthouse' to be the first to file securities class actions.... [W]e no longer have
'professional plaintiffs' ... [and] the expensive and time consuming 'fishing expedition'
discovery process." Id.
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A narrow reading of SLUSA creates a loophole in PSLRA for
Securities Act claims. Under the narrow reading, plaintiffs could
continue to bring large class action strike suits alleging Securities Act
violations. The broad reading of removal authority, however, allows
defendants to remove class actions alleging federal claims to federal
court where the procedural protections provided by PSLRA, such as
the automatic stay of discovery1 98 and requirement of a lead
plaintiff,199 apply. Thus, only the broad reading ensures the extension
of PSLRA's restrictions to Securities Act claims and achieves the
protection against strike suits intended by PSLRA and SLUSA.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the problem of strike suits as
early as 1975 in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, °° noting that
''a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim [can] simply take up the
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value."2 ' According to
one source, approximately "190 class-action lawsuits alleging
securities fraud are filed each year. Because companies fear large
judgments, many settle such lawsuits. ' 20 2 By one account, the average
securities class action settlement in 2004 had risen to $46.2 million.0 3
In enacting PSLRA, Congress reviewed reports of "abuse in
private securities lawsuits. '' 2° The Conference report specifically
noted "the routine filing of lawsuits ... whenever there is a significant
change in... stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability
...[and] the targeting of deep pocket defendants ... without regard
to their actual culpability. 2 5 The PSLRA Conference Committee
report noted that "the private securities litigation system is too
important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this
198. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b) (2000).
199. Id. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B).
200. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).

201. Id. at 741.
202. Hope Yen, Court Affirms Fraud Standard: Justices Say Investors Must Prove Link
to Stock Losses, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2005, at E03. Cf. Tu, supra note 82, at 475, 478

(analyzing the seven cases asserting securities violations which have been litigated to a
verdict since the passage of PSLRA and arguing that increasing settlement costs and
recent favorable defense verdicts may create an "incentive for defendants in the right
situation (with a good case) to take their case through trial").
203. Tu, supra note 82, at 478 (compiling the findings from several different economic
analysis firms regarding average and total settlement amounts for securities class actions).
This is up from an average of $26 million from 1995 to 2003. Id.; see also supra note 82
(collecting research on settlement amounts).
204. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730.
205. Id.; see also Qualters, supra note 82 (suggesting that a securities lawsuit may be
provoked simply by the filing of an earnings restatement).
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system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets
by bringing abusive and meritless suits." 2" As Congress noted in
passing PSLRA, without these protections, companies cannot attract
talented and experienced directors, and the concern over meritless
lawsuits may restrict dissemination of information. 2 7 As noted in
Part II.D, 2 °8 the Supreme Court recently endorsed these views in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit. °9 The narrow
reading allows plaintiffs to sidestep PSLRA's heightened obligations
for large class actions alleging Securities Act claims. As such, the
narrow reading allows large class actions to continue, unrestrained by
PSLRA, so long as the complaint only alleges violations of the
Securities Act.
The broad reading, by contrast, shifts class actions alleging
Securities Act violations to federal court where they are subject to
PSLRA, thus avoiding the creation of a subcategory of class actions
immune from PSLRA's safeguards. By subjecting these claims to
PSLRA, the broad reading makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to
harass corporations with unmeritorious suits, thereby protecting
investors, who are "always ...the ultimate losers when extortionate
'settlements' are extracted from issuers. ,210
B.

EncouragingIndividualActions by InstitutionalInvestors

Congress passed PSLRA primarily to curb vexatious class action
lawsuits, which they felt committed the gravest abuses of securities
litigation.2 1' However, as the Supreme Court noted in Dabit,
SLUSA does not actually pre-empt any state cause of action. It
simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class action device to
vindicate certain claims. The Act does not deny any individual
plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs, 1the
2
right to enforce any state-law cause of action that may exist.
Thus, plaintiffs bringing individual lawsuits can avoid many of
PSLRA's restrictions 13 because SLUSA's removal provision applies
only to class actions.2" 4 Plaintiffs bringing individual suits may clearly
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,730-31.
Id. at 31-32, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
126 S. Ct. 1503, 1514 (2006).
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
Dabit,126 S. Ct. at 1510-11.
Id. at 1514 (explaining SLUSA's scope in relation to Exchange Act claims).
2 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 7.17[2].
15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000).
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maintain the suit in state court and avoid many of the heightened
requirements of PSLRA.
This distinction reflects Congress's
additional concern for the class action's potential for abuse.1 5
The exception for individual actions indirectly encourages
individual actions by large stakeholders, most commonly institutional
investors. 16 Institutional investors, with the money to fund large
individual suits, can file separate actions in state court and avoid the
costly and time-consuming burdens of PSLRA.2 7 Indeed, one
commentator noted that the combined effect of PSLRA and SLUSA
has been that "[n]early every major class action securities fraud case
is now accompanied by intensely litigated individual actions by
institutions that never brought such suits ten years ago. '"218
These individual actions are more likely to be meritorious
because the investor bringing an individual claim bears the financial
risk of losing the suit alone. Indeed, one court noted that "[i]f an
institutional investor, which represents the long-term interests of
many small investors, decides that a certain form of relief is
appropriate, it is more likely superior for the majority of investors
than the relief which would be sought by a 'professional plaintiff's'

lawyer. "219
Another commentator noted as follows:
It might be said that a leading role in enforcing the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws in civil litigations was long
overdue for sophisticated institutional investors who make
markets and have large stakes. That the captains of the
investment community should a [sic] play a role in checking
fraud even beyond that anticipated by the promulgators of the
PSLRA should be considered a welcome precipitate.22 °

215. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 52, § 12.5[1].

216. Mack, supra note 195 (noting that the heightened requirements imposed by
PSLRA and the complementary preclusion and removal provisions of subject class actions
by SLUSA may "have had the intended consequence of awakening the sleeping giants of
institutional investors and the unintended consequence of prompting them to file
individual rather than class actions").
217. See supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also Mack, supra note 195 ("In
short, the slower results and restriction to federal causes of action available in class actions
are driving to the courthouse entities that once were satisfied to quietly wait on the
sidelines and take a modest check as a class member.").
218. Mack, supra note 195.
219. Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation:
The Role of Institutional Investors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 155, 155

(quoting Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997)).
220. Mack, supra note 195.
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However, for complaints alleging pure Securities Act claims, the
beneficial result of more individual actions by institutional investors
can be fully achieved only under a broad reading of § 16(c). Under
the narrow reading, courts remand pure Securities Act class actions to
state courts, where PSLRA's restrictions do not apply. Because the
narrow reading allows both individual actions and class actions to
avoid PSLRA's requirements, the narrow reading provides no
incentive for the individual actions. Thus, institutional investors may
once again become "satisfied to quietly wait on the sidelines and take
' On the contrary, district courts
a modest check as a class member."221
which broadly interpret § 16(c)'s removal authority deny the class
action plaintiff's motion to remand, allowing the case to remain in
federal court and, thus, subject to PSLRA's restrictions.222 This
encourages institutional investors, eager to circumvent the longer
waiting period created by PSLRA, to file individual actions in state
court rather than undergo the more costly and time-consuming
procedures imposed on class actions by PSLRA. Only the broad
reading of § 16(c) applies PSLRA's restrictions in the Securities Act
context, thus providing the incentive to file individual actions-and
remain in state in court-when Securities Act violations are at stake.
The narrow reading, on the other hand, would deprive the market of
the benefit of more active participation of institutional investors.
Furthermore, PSLRA's restrictions encourage the appointment
of institutional investors as lead plaintiff. Thus, even if the
application of PSLRA does not result in more individual filings by
institutional investors, it would still benefit the market to have these
investors more involved in class actions as the lead plaintiff. One
author notes several reasons why the market benefits from
institutional investors acting as lead plaintiff:
Their repeat player status ... causes institutions to bear a

higher proportion of costs associated with inefficiencies in the
securities litigation system, such as losses to legal fees that are
not based on competitive market rates and costs associated with
prosecuting and defending unnecessary cases. With this broad
presence in the equity markets, their overwhelming interests in
individual cases, and their fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of investors, institutions have incentives to pursue both
of the competing interests involved in securities litigation. As
the largest claimants, they have a strong interest in maximizing
recoveries in class action lawsuits. However, they also have a
221. Mack, supra note 195.
222. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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direct incentive both to increase portfolio returns by taking
actions to reduce losses to securities fraud through enhanced
deterrence and to improve efficiency of the system. 23
The narrow reading, however, allows class actions to circumvent
22 4
PSLRA's requirements, including the lead plaintiff requirement.
Thus, the narrow reading would deprive the market of the benefit of
more active participation of institutional investors.
CONCLUSION

Only a broad reading of § 16(c) accurately reflects the correct
confluence of statutory language, legislative history, and policy.
SLUSA amended both the Securities Act and Exchange Act to
prevent class action lawyers from using state courts to circumvent
PSLRA,225 and the statute should be interpreted to effect that
intention. Reading the amendment to allow only the removal of
precluded state-law claims prevents those plaintiffs asserting
Exchange Act violations from filing in state courts and avoiding
PSLRA, but does not prevent similar gamesmanship by plaintiffs
asserting Securities Act violations.22 6 SLUSA should also prevent
parties filing class actions for Securities Act violations from avoiding
PSLRA; it should extend removal authority to Securities Act claims
brought as class actions. Reading SLUSA to exempt Securities Act
claims from PSLRA leaves its amendment to the Securities Act
superfluous. 22 7 Specifically, because SLUSA amended the Exchange
Act to provide for the removal and preclusion of state-law claims
based on securities fraud, it would be unnecessary to amend the
Securities Act again to provide for the removal and preclusion of
state-law claims based on securities fraud. This is especially true in
light of the amendment SLUSA made to the Securities Act's
provision granting concurrent, nonremovable jurisdiction 22 8-the
provision relied on by proponents of the narrow reading to advocate
for nonremoval. Thus, reading SLUSA's amendment to § 16(c) of
the Securities Act broadly provides the most consistent interpretation
of the statute as a whole and effects congressional intent.

223. Johnson, supra note 219, at 158 (citations omitted).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000).
225. See supra Part III.
226. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 84, 104-05 and accompanying text (noting SLUSA's addition of an
"except" clause in § 22).
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The nonreviewable nature of orders to remand magnifies the
negative effects of narrowly reading § 16(c). The ability to file suit in
multiple localities allows plaintiffs the opportunity to avoid
jurisdictions where federal district courts typically deny motions to
remand class actions alleging only Securities Act violations. District
courts in the same state have split on the issue of remand. The lack of
appellate review 29 exacerbates such splits and creates incentives for
plaintiffs to forum shop. Thus, district courts must uniformly refuse
motions to remand pure Securities Act claims. If they do not,
PSLRA's protections may be lost for defendants, as plaintiffs attempt
to file in jurisdictions with a precedent of granting motions to remand.
The application of PSLRA's provisions is too important for such
inconsistency.
Only the broad reading of § 16(c) provides the adequate
protection from strike suits that Congress intended. State courts do
not provide the same procedural protection from vexatious litigation
that federal courts provide to defendants. Indeed, this inadequate
state protection provided the impetus for SLUSA.2 3 ° Without the
limitations imposed by PSLRA, state courts may permit the abuse of
the discovery process that often forces defendants to settle
unmeritorious claims.
As the average settlement cost rises,"3 broadly applying
PSLRA's restrictions becomes increasingly important in order to curb
nonmeritorious suits. Indeed, the scandals of Enron and WorldCom
may make companies especially vulnerable to strike suits, as the
public grows increasingly skeptical of big business.2 32 As public
scrutiny of publicly held companies increases, the plaintiff's leverage
in settlement negotiations increases. 233 This heightens the need for a
uniform application of PSLRA, and such an application can be
achieved only through a broad reading of SLUSA's removal
authority.

229. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2153 (2006). The Court did note,
however, that the issue could still potentially reach the Supreme Court through state
channels. See id. However, in the absence of an order granting a motion for interlocutory
appeal, the case would have to proceed through trial on the merits first. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (providing the authorization for an interlocutory appeal in federal
courts).
230. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 101,112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000)).
231. See supra notes 82, 203 and accompanying text.
232. See Tu, supra note 82, at 478.
233. See id.
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Moreover, a uniform interpretation of SLUSA would help to
unify the standards applied to securities fraud cases. Through
SLUSA, Congress attempted to create a federal system of securities
regulation.23 4 Uniformity and consistency reduce uncertainty and
create a more predictable market, thereby decreasing the operational
risk of corporations and facilitating the development of a more
efficient market.
The broad interpretation of § 16(c)-applying the removal
provision to class action claims alleging solely Securities Act
violations-accurately reflects the appropriate consistency across
statutory language, legislative history, and policy considerations.
Because orders to remand are not reviewable, uniform application of
the broad reading can be achieved only if the federal district courts
each independently adopt a consistent reading of the statute. The
growing district court split creates uncertainty for plaintiffs and
defendants alike, straining the efficient operation of capital markets.
Only a broad interpretation of § 16(c) will achieve the safeguards
intended by Congress: those safeguards necessary to protect the
integrity of the market.
WILLIAM B. SNYDER, JR.

234. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1514
(2006) (noting "the congressional preference for 'national standards for securities class
action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities' " (quoting § 2(5), 112 Stat. at 3227));
see also supra Part III.

